Measuring the benefits to advertising under
monopolistic competition by Boland, Michael A. et al.
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 37(1):144–155
Copyright 2012 Western Agricultural Economics Association
Measuring the Benefits to Advertising under
Monopolistic Competition
Michael A. Boland, John M. Crespi, Jena Silva, and Tian Xia
This paper determines the benefits and costs of firm-level advertising in a monopolistically
competitive industry. The model is useful in an environment in which firm-level costs may be
absent or imprecise. The empirical example uses data on the advertising for a new line of prune
snacks by Sunsweet Growers between 2008 and 2010, revealing average benefit-cost estimates
from $1.26 to $4.35 for every dollar allocated to the new product line.
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Introduction
Nearly all published studies measuring the benefits and costs of advertising in agricultural markets
focus on the specific type of advertising known as generic advertising, which is financed by industry
producers. There are nearly 250 published studies–including 124 peer-reviewed journal articles and
chapters in 14 books–examining the effectiveness of collective commodity promotion programs.1
The overwhelming majority of these studies have shown that benefits outweigh costs, many of
which are summarized in Alston et al. (2007). However, there is little research measuring the
impact of advertising for a specific food product. Food products are increasingly heterogeneous
as firms are able to create and market successful brands. Furthermore, as these firms turn to
new branded product development and increased brand-level advertising to defend market share,
many of these industries arguably resemble monopolistically competitive industries, for which no
empirical measure of advertising return has been reported in the agricultural economics literature.
The objective of this research is to estimate an average benefit-cost ratio for a firm operating in a
monopolistically competitive industry. The food product we use is a differentiated prune marketed
by Sunsweet Growers.
Monopolistic Competition
The theoretical work on monopolistic competition was initially done by Chamberlin (1933) and
Robinson (1933). Monopolistically competitive industries are typified by multiple distinct firms
selling branded products that are slightly differentiated; as such, prices typically differ among
competing brands. These markets differ from traditional oligopoly structures in that barriers to entry
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are lower–but not absent–with economic profits diminishing as new entrants enter the market with
slightly differentiated brands of their own. Brand advertising contributes to fixed costs in the short
run because a firm must often set its advertising budget far in advance of sales. Under monopolistic
competition, economic profit is short-lived as new firms enter the market and profits dissipate.
The difference between this equilibrium and that of perfect competition is that with free entry but
differentiated products, firms under monopolistic competition price at an average cost that is above
marginal cost (e.g., Carlton and Perloff, 2005, pp. 206-208).
Because barriers to entry are lower under monopolistic competition than under oligopoly or
monopoly, firms can earn short-run economic profit by creating and marketing new products and
reaping the short-term benefits of a price above both marginal and average cost, at least until rivals
create their own slightly different versions of that product or new firms enter the market. Our interest
is in calculating the benefit-to-cost ratio for such short-run profit through new product development
and advertising.
Methods of Estimating Average Benefit-Cost Ratios
There are multiple ways to estimate the benefits and costs of generic advertising, product promotion,
or product development.2 One of the most widely-used techniques is econometric estimation of a
demand curve as a function of prices, generic advertising, and other variables. With the econometric
model of “reality” in hand, researchers can determine the counterfactual shift in the demand curve
that would have occurred over the sample period had advertising been absent. Benefit-cost analyses
then measure the changes in profit associated with advertising.
For generic advertising under perfect competition, the counterfactual (no advertising) shift in
the demand curve provides only limited information because a supply curve is needed to discern the
equilibrium. Alston et al. (2007) note that the modeling technique most commonly used simulates
aggregate industry surplus changes with and without the advertising expenditures by interacting the
estimated demand curve and a simulated industry supply curve. By calibrating a supply function
to the price-quantity equilibrium, researchers then estimate the cost to the producers from the
advertising and measure this against the demand shift with and without advertising.
Estimating the Benefits of Advertising under Monopolistic Competition
The greater the level of differentiation in a monopolistically competitive industry, the less a firm’s
demand responds to its competitors’ actions. As such, firm demand curves are downward sloping.
Price-dependent demand is given by P(Q,A), where Q is the quantity. Function A relates how
the firm’s advertising expenditures, ADV , are translated into the shift in the demand curve, where
A = f (ADV ) with f ′(ADV )> 0 for ADV > 0 and f (0) = 0. To measure the benefits of firm-level
advertising under monopolistic competition, three main components need to be developed: (1)
average cost and demand parameters, (2) consumer demand response from advertising, and (3)
measures of the shift in the demand and the average cost curves.
Measuring Average Cost and Demand Parameters
Without a direct measure of firm costs, we adopt two potential cost functions. Costs under
monopolistic competition are presumed to be fixed; a component of that fixed cost is expected to
come in the form of marketing expenditures. Our first functional form is based on Robinson’s 1933
proxy for firm costs under monopolistic competition:
(1) C(Q,ADV ) = a + cQ + ADV,
2 In keeping with the literature, we use advertising throughout the rest of the paper to include promotion and product
development.
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where marginal cost is per-unit and fixed costs are divided into the cost of the advertising
expenditure, ADV , and other fixed costs, a. The second functional form allows marginal cost to
increase with Q:
(2) C(Q,ADV ) = a + gQ2 + ADV,
where MC = 2gQ and g > 0. These two forms were chosen because they represent a wide range of
solutions under profit maximization. Variants of these standard forms have been used in describing
firms under monopolistic competition (e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Carlton and Perloff, 2005, pp.
207-210). A firm’s average cost functions under these two formulations are C(Q,ADV )/Q or:
(3) AC =
a
Q
+ c +
ADV
Q
under constant marginal cost and
(4) AC =
a
Q
+ gQ +
ADV
Q
under increasing marginal cost.3 To explain the steps for calculating the benefit-cost ratio, we use
figure 1, which uses a simple linear demand function and constant marginal cost.
Consider a firm in a monopolistically competitive industry as seen in figure 1. The tangency of
demand (D0) and average cost (AC0) is shown for the equilibrium (Q0,P0). If the firm is able to
undertake a successful, demand-enhancing, short-run advertising of its product, demand shifts to
D1, bringing with it a new price-quantity combination (Q1,P1) at the point where the new marginal
revenue (MR1) is equal to MC. New advertising expenditures also increase costs. If the outward shift
in the average cost from AC0 to AC1 from the advertising expense results in average cost below D1,
then the benefits of advertising outweigh the costs of advertising. Specifically, these per-unit benefits
are the difference between the new price, P1, and the new average cost, AC1. Under monopolistic
competition, these profits exist only in the short run until new firms enter the market or existing
firms exploit their own advertising changes; the new equilibrium occurs at a tangency with a reduced
demand for the firm. A firm operating under monopolistic competition will only advertise if it can
effectively shift its demand curve by more than its average cost curve. Our goal is to measure the
impact of such a shift.
Estimating Demand Response
Superscript 1 represents the functions that correspond to the state of the firm’s marketing in reality
and superscript 0 refers to the counterfactual condition if the firm had not undertaken any marketing
expense (such as advertising) to shift its demand. The first step is to econometrically estimate the
demand curve (D1 = P1(Q1,A)) in the presence of advertising. From this estimate, we construct total
revenue, T R1 = P1(Q1,A)Q1, in order to obtain marginal revenue, MR1 = MR1(Q1,A), by taking the
derivative of the total revenue curve with respect to quantity and then evaluating this function at the
observed Q1 and ADV levels in the data. We derive marginal cost using the assumption of profit
maximization MR1 = MC.4
Measuring the Shift in Demand and Average Cost
The next step is to ascertain what the quantity and price would have been in the absence of any
advertising (Q0,P0). To find marginal revenue with no advertising we set advertising equal to
3 The first AC formulation is often shown as a textbook case in presentations of monopolistic competition because it
forces a firm to operate in the downward sloping portion of its average cost curve, as this AC function asymptotes on the fixed
marginal cost as quantity increases.
4 In the case of constant MC, we have MR1 = c and in the case of increasing MC, we solve for g in MR1 = 2gQ1.
Boland et al. Advertising & Monopolistic Competition 147
zero in our MR1 function to get MR0. In monopolistic competition, quantity in the counterfactual
condition exists where marginal revenue equals marginal cost and where the demand and average
cost functions are tangent. When ADV = 0, AC0 is the average cost function and D0 is the price-
dependent demand function. We simultaneously solve MR0 = MC and
(5)
dAC0
dQ0
=
dD0
dQ0
for Q0 and the level of non-advertising fixed cost, a. Once Q0 is determined, counterfactual price,
P0, is found using Q0 in the demand curve without advertising. Because the only difference between
AC1 and AC0 is ADV , AC1 is:
(6) AC1 =
a
Q1
+ c +
ADV
Q1
in the case of constant marginal cost and
(7) AC1 =
a
Q1
+ gQ1 +
ADV
Q1
in the case of increasing marginal costs.
Finally, we must construct and interpret the benefit-cost ratio, BC. Under monopolistic
competition, economic profits at (Q0,P0) in figure 1 are zero by construction. If there is no change
in profits from undertaking the advertising, then pi0 = pi1
(8) P0Q0 − AC0Q0 = P1Q1 − AC1Q1.
In such a case, the ratio
(9) BC =
P1Q1 − P0Q0
AC1Q1 − AC0Q0 = 1
defines the change in revenues divided by the change in costs. If pi1 > 0, then BC > 1 means
advertising contributed more to revenues than to costs and BC < 1 means the advertising harmed
the firm.5
The U.S. Prune Industry and Monopolistic Competition
The most commonly used test for monopolistic competition is that of Panzar and Rosse (1987).
The Panzar-Rosse test and its variants examine firm revenues to test among perfect competition,
monopoly, and monopolistic competition. The model requires not only a panel of firm-level data–
including data for each firm’s input costs–but also presumes that firms are operating in a long-run
equilibrium where price is equal to average cost. In our case, the Panzar-Rosse test is unsuitable not
only because we lack the necessary input costs but also because we assert that Sunsweet is trying to
break free from a long-run equilibrium.
Much of the literature on monopolistic competition simply asserts its presence based on evidence
from the industry of interest. There are many such examples, especially in the areas of international
trade and retail financial services, including Krugman (1979), Lanclos and Hertel (1995), Heffernan
5 A study of figure 1 shows that as long as the shifts in D and AC are parallel, BC is non-negative. However, there are two
cases to also consider. First, if the shifts are not parallel, theoretically one could obtain a negative BC using the definition in
equation (8). Second, a case can occur where profits are negative regardless the shape of the cost and revenue functions, but
BC is still positive as long as the difference in revenue in BC (numerator) is greater than the difference in costs (denominator).
This is why BC > 1 and pi1 > 0 are both necessary. Though perhaps unlikely, in either of these cases one can simply report
the profit change instead of BC.
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Figure 1. Beneficial Short-Term Advertising under Monopolistic Competition.
(2002), Coto-Martínez (2006), Feenstra and Taylor (2008), Ruan, Gopinath, and Buccola (2008) and
Feenstra and Weinstein (2010). Studies of the food sector are few and nearly entirely devoted to the
use of the theory in the trade of food and agricultural goods. This is especially true in the literature
on intra-industry international trade, where Sheldon (2006, p. 26) argues that “the monopolistic
competition model has become the dominant theoretical alternative to the neoclassical model” and
offers empirical evidence to support that theory for trade in food and agricultural products.
Industrial Organization of U.S. Prune Industry
The industry sector for Dried and Dehydrated Food (NAICS code 311423) has mostly escaped the
increasing concentration seen in other food sectors, with a four-firm concentration ratio in 2007
of only 35.9% (U.S. Department of Commerce, June 2010). Within this sector, per-capita prune
consumption has been declining for a number of years. In 1996, U.S. prune growers produced
about 200,000 tons of prunes. Today this number has fallen by about 60,000 tons (U.S. Department
of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistical Services, June 2009); the decline is in both U.S.
domestic and export markets. Yet while demand has declined, the number of competitors has
increased. In the 1990s there were three major firms selling prunes in the domestic, branded market:
Sunsweet, Del Monte, and Dole (Alston et al., March 1998). Of these, Sunsweet had nearly 80%
of the retail market share (Crespi and Marette, 2002). Today, there are six major players including
private label, and Sunsweet’s retail share has dropped to less than 60%.6 Although not definitive
evidence, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) note that a decrease in quantity demanded coupled with an
increasing variety of products is one of the possible outcomes of monopolistic competition.
Advertising, Promotion, and Product Development
Sunsweet uses both television advertising and marketing promotions, while its competitors rely
almost entirely on marketing promotions. Firms selling homogeneous products under either perfect
competition or under oligopoly (where prices are nearly identical across competitors) forgo most
advertising because of the free-rider effect noted by Alston et al. (2007). Firms in oligopolies with
6 The major public brands are Sunsweet, Sun Maid, Dole, Del Monte, Mariani, and Champion.
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differentiated products, on the other hand, create large barriers to entry when those few firms all
advertise (e.g., Coke and Pepsi in the carbonated beverage industry). This advertising is successful
if it maintains the industry status quo, as discussed by Sutton (1991). Sunsweet increased advertising
of its prunes in 1996 when there were only two other major competitors. The increase in number of
firms since 1996 suggests that advertising is not a significant barrier to entry, giving further credence
to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) result that declining demand and increased variety come about under
monopolistic competition if fixed costs (e.g., advertising) are low barriers to entry.
Prunes are Differentiated
Prune brands are clearly differentiated, as can be seen in the per-unit prices of retail prunes. A
comparison of retail prices per pound of the least and most expensive brands in our data shows
prices nearly twice as high for the most expensive brand. Making the same comparison for the
second-highest priced brand and the second-to-lowest priced brand reveals a 32% premium. In other
words, the brand-to-brand price differences are well above the typical marketing margins for retail
products. Given that the underlying input is similar across firms, cost cannot be the only explanation
for price differences and consumers are clearly not regarding brands of prunes as perfect substitutes.
Product variety from more than just a few firms is a key assumption of monopolistic competition.
Data Description
The data used for this research are U.S. branded product, weekly data from July 20, 2008, through
June 13, 2010, resulting in 100 observations. Recently, Sunsweet developed a new product in
an effort to differentiate prunes. The board of directors debated this differentiation strategy over
several years and ultimately hired a new CEO to undertake this new strategic direction. The specific
product is Sunsweet Ones, individually wrapped dried prunes that come in a canister containing
approximately twenty prunes. Sunsweet’s advertising promotes the nutritional value associated with
prunes.7 No other firm has a similar product line.
The regression model and choice of data was influenced by the evaluation of the California Prune
Board’s Promotion Program conducted by Alston et al. (March 1998). Table 1 provides a detailed
listing of the variables, units and sources used in our econometric models and table 2 presents the
summary statistics.
The quantity of Ones (Q) was provided by Sunsweet from their Infoscan IRI database of weekly
prune sales across the United States, representing approximately 86% of Sunsweet’s total sales. The
variable represents total pounds of Sunsweet Ones prunes consumed in the United States for the
specified week. There are multiple price variables used in this model: the OnesP variable and SunP
variable represent average price per pound of Sunsweet Ones prunes and other Sunsweet prunes,
respectively. Because the analysis presented previously was for a firm, we wanted to use prices as
close to possible to what Sunsweet actually receives as opposed to retail level prices. After consulting
with Sunsweet’s marketing department, these data were multiplied by a markdown percentage of
59% to convert retail prices to Sunsweet’s estimate of its received price.
Sunsweet also provided data on the quantities and price per pound of five of Sunsweet’s largest
competitors. The prices of the competitors are Private Label Pricing (PLP, an aggregation of in-
store store brands in the Infoscan IRI data), Sun Maid Pricing (SMP), Mariani Pricing (MP), Del
Monte Pricing (DMP), and Champion Pricing (CP). All prices were adjusted to 2010 dollars using
7 A reviewer pointed out that a model of profit-maximization may only be a proxy for a firm like Sunsweet, which is
a cooperative and not a private firm. This is a good point and the interested reader is referred to Staatz (1983) and Sexton
(1986a,b) for discussions of this issue. Rather than provide a model for the optimal setting of advertising in a cooperative
setting, however, we acknowledge the issue and continue with the present formulation on the data at hand, since most
estimations using this technique are likely to be for profit-maximizing firms and it is arguably a useful proxy for this
cooperative.
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Table 1. Definitions, Units, and Sources of Variables Used in this Study
Variable Definition Units Data Source
Q Weekly volume sales of Sunsweet’s Ones prunes. Pounds Infoscan IRI data provided
by Sunsweet
OnesP Average price of Sunsweet Ones prunes to the
retailers.
Real dollars
(2010) per
pound
Retail prices from Infoscan
IRI data provided by
Sunsweet and deflated by
CPI from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
SunP, PLP,
SMP, MP,
DMP, CP
Average price of Sunsweet’s other prunes, private
label, Sun Maid, Mariani, Del Monte and Champion
brand prunes, respectively, to the retailers.
Real dollars
(2010) per
pound
as above
Income Yearly average personal income. Personal income
by quarter in
real dollars
(2010)
Per-capita income from the
Bureau of Economic
Analysis and adjusted by
CPI
Trend Time trend 1,2,3.........100
Summer,
Spring,
Winter
Summer, Spring, Winter Dummy Variables,
respectively.
ACVDisp,
ACVFeat,
ACVFD
Percentage all commodity value of retail stores with
a feature, display and feature and display,
respectively, aggregated for all brands.
Percentage Infoscan IRI data provided
by Sunsweet
ADV,
ADV1-
ADV5
Weekly budgeted expenditures for Ones advertising
and respective weekly lags.
Real dollars
(2010) per week
of advertising
Expenditures correspond to
weekly advertisements
provided by Sunsweet and
adjusted by CPI
Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Variables used in this Study
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Q 100 36,614.2 11,791.2 15,864.1 58,734.8
OnesP 100 3.6 0.1 3.3 3.7
SunP 100 2.6 0.2 2.1 2.8
PLP 100 1.8 0.04 1.7 1.9
SMP 100 2.6 0.1 2.5 2.8
MP 100 1.9 0.1 1.5 2.2
DMP 100 2.1 0.2 1.2 2.3
CP 100 2.2 0.2 1.3 2.5
Income 100 35,915.9 314.0 35,158.5 36,531.1
Trend 100 50.5 29.0 1.0 100.0
ACVDISP 100 31.4 4.4 20.8 40.1
ACVFeat 100 3.3 2.0 0.6 10.2
ACVFeatDisp 100 0.9 0.7 0.0 4.2
ADV 100 9,887.9 13,571.3 0.0 29,625.0
the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI) and
multiplied by a 59% markdown to convert retail prices to processor prices. All price variables
represent the weighted average price per pound of prunes nationally. This average consists of the
average promoted price per pound and the average non-promoted price per pound for that week
weighted by the share of sales in these weeks and, thus, reflect promotional price discounts at the
point of sale.
Income is U.S. quarterly per-capita personal income adjusted to 2010 dollars using the CPI.
Alston et al. (March 1998) found that consumption of prunes varies by season. Seasonal dummy
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variables denote Summer (July-Sept.), Spring (April-June), Winter (Jan-Mar); fall (Oct-Dec) is used
as the base season. The seasonal dummy variables are given a value of one for each month with a
majority of its days in a given season and zero otherwise.
The Infoscan IRI data contained information regarding in-store, non-advertising promotions.
These are a measure of the “Percentage All Commodity Value” of retail stores using trade
merchandising “reach” or “depth” of support for a product. That is, the percentage of stores in terms
of annual sales that sold the product with some type of merchandising–such as features (ACVFeat),
displays (ACVDisp), or combinations of the two (ACVFD)–during the sample period. A feature is a
product promotion without a display such as newspaper advertisement or a store mailing. A display
is a promotion using an in-store display without being otherwise advertised at or by the store.8
As described by Crespi and Marette (2002, p. 696), these variables are “roughly dummy variables
weighted by store size that show whether a particular promotion was occurring in a store at time t.”
The relationship between Sunsweet’s advertising of its Ones product (ADV ) and the function A
in the theoretical model was chosen to be a simple linear combination of present day and lagged
advertising expenditures. In the model presented in this paper, the cost of advertising is borne by the
sales of the product. For a multi-product firm such as Sunsweet, budgets are fungible, so the cost-
share for any single product must be derived. After reviewing Sunsweet’s budgets and consulting
with Sunsweet’s marketing department regarding cost shares, advertising-to-sales expectations and
timing and types of media exposures, the advertising variable was constructed and adjusted by the
CPI Index for all Ones television advertising over the sample period.9 Because advertising effects
need not be instantaneous, we constructed five lagged advertising variables (ADV 1-ADV 5), where
ADV 1 is ADV lagged one week, ADV 2 is ADV lagged two weeks, etc.
Finally, a time trend variable was added to the model (Trend) to account for other factors
affecting prune consumption as suggested by Alston et al. (March 1998). We know that prune
consumption has declined over time, so we may expect the sign of this variable to be negative.
One limitation is that we do not know how much other firms are spending on their advertising.
However we do know that most of the firms do virtually no advertising for prunes, except for what
is done by the California Dried Plum Board with respect to generic advertising. We did not have
access to data on the generic advertising for prunes that is conducted by the California Dried Plum
Board. Our assumption is that this advertising affects all firms in similar ways, but to the extent its
absence biases the results, we do note this caveat.10
Estimation of Econometric Model Parameters
For comparison, we estimated a linear specification and a constant-elasticity or double-log
specification for the demand functions using ordinary least squares. We lacked useful weekly
instruments to control for potential endogeneity, but the Alston et al. (March 1998) study on prune
8 Models were estimated using these variables for Sunsweet and each of its competitors, which not only greatly reduced
the degrees of freedom but also revealed problems with multicollinearity (many of these marketing specials run in tandem).
Nonetheless, they did add to the fit of the model and removing them was not an option. We chose instead not to use these
variables in their firm-level form and instead aggregated each of them. These variables essentially proxy all firm or store
expenditures on marketing excluding television advertising expenditures and can be best thought of as representing promotion
but not advertising.
9 Sunsweet’s total advertising budgets for all of its prune and non-prune product lines annually averaged $26 million
during the sample period, amounting to roughly 8% of its annual net sales revenue (Sunsweet Growers, 2010). The amount
spent on Ones was between 3% and 5% of net sales. During the sample period, all of Sunsweet’s prune-related advertising
was devoted to the Ones product and a prune juice called PlumSmart in order to position these new products in the market.
Sunsweet took this strategy for three reasons: the launch of a new product, market penetration into new outlets such as drug
stores (e.g., Walgreens), and the belief that advertising Ones also helped increase demand for all of its other products.
10 A reviewer asked why an industry with differentiated products would also have a generic advertising program. We
asked members of management and the board who indicated that the answer is historical. The California Dried Plum Board,
previously the California Prune Board, was established in 1952 when the focus was the marketing of a commodity.
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Table 3. Regression Results for Sunsweet Ones Brand under Linear and Constant Elasticity
Specifications
Coefficient Std Err Elast Coefficient Std Err
Linear Specificationa Constant Elasticity Specificationa
Constant −98,876.80∗b 52,637.20 −52.57∗∗∗ 20.84
Sunsweet Ones Price −10,642.10∗∗∗ 2,301.00 −1.74 −1.81∗∗∗ 0.41
Sunsweet Other Price 1,132.51 2,320.10 0.08 0.12 0.18
Private Label Price 17,945.36 14,268.90 0.90 1.04 0.81
Sun Maid Price −11,885.90∗ 6,848.90 −0.86 −0.22 0.54
Mariani Price −1,430.65 4,531.00 −0.08 −0.01 0.25
Del Monte Price −376.63 2,477.80 −0.02 −0.05 0.12
Champion Price 7,681.11∗ ∗ ∗ 2,628.40 0.46 0.22 0.15
Income 4.07∗∗ 1.86 3.99 5.48∗∗∗ 2.03
Trend 34.32 35.46 0.001 0.001
Summer −346.92 1,161.20 −0.02 0.03
Spring 610.63 1,135.30 0.001 0.04
Winter 4,621.46∗∗∗ 969.50 0.12∗∗∗ 0.03
ACV Display 736.54∗∗∗ 226.00 0.84∗∗∗ 0.21
ACV Feature 196.95 262.70 0.03 0.03
ACV Feature & Display −123.99 603.00 −0.01 0.02
Ones Advertising 0.011∗∗∗ 0.002 0.060 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002
Ones Advertising Lag 1 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.067 0.014∗∗∗ 0.002
Ones Advertising Lag 2 0.010∗∗∗ 0.002 0.053 0.011∗∗∗ 0.002
Ones Advertising Lag 3 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 0.028 0.009∗∗∗ 0.002
Ones Advertising Lag 4 0.003∗ 0.001 0.016 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002
Ones Advertising Lag 5 0.004∗∗ 0.002 0.020 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002
Long Run Advertising
Elastc
0.211 0.056
Adjusted R2 0.944 0.943
Notes: a Dependent variable is quantity sales (lbs.) and logged quantity sales, respectively.
b Single, double, and triple asterisks (∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗) represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
c Long-run advertising elasticity is the aggregation of the short-run elasticities.
demand found no appreciable difference in demand estimations whether endogeneity was controlled
for or not. We estimate the models in their quantity-dependent form.
Table 3 shows the coefficient, elasticities, and other statistics for Sunsweet’s Ones demand
regression using both the linear specification and the constant-elasticity specification. Both
specifications had an adjusted R2 of 0.94 and both models show that the price and advertising
coefficients were significantly different from zero. The price elasticities for both models are similar
at -1.74 on average for the linear specification and -1.81 for the constant elasticity specification. The
Ones product appears priced in the elastic region of the demand functions, which is necessary for a
firm with price-setting ability.
The advertising elasticities are positive and significant in both models and decline with lags as
expected. The advertising elasticities were quite different for the two models, as can be seen in
the sum of the elasticities over the lags. The long-run elasticity is 0.21 for the linear specification
but only 0.06 for the constant-elasticity case, which affects how the benefits to advertising are
determined; we should expect to see lower benefit-cost measures for the constant-elasticity demand
specification. The income coefficient is positive and significant in both models consistent with
prunes being a normal good. Seasonality appears correlated with demand for Ones with winter
months correlated with higher demand. The effect appears in both models and was also found by
Alston et al. (March 1998).
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While a number of coefficients in both models were insignificant, we chose to leave the variables
in the models in part as proxies for variables we may be missing. For example, while the other prices,
with perhaps the exception of Champion and Sun Maid prunes in the linear specification, add no
significant change based upon the standard errors of the coefficient values, an F-test revealed that
jointly these price coefficients are significant in both specifications.
Likewise, the ACV Display coefficient is positive and significant in both specifications,
suggesting promotional displays placed in stores do increase demand, but the ACV Feature and
ACV Feature & Display coefficients are insignificant in both models. An F-test revealed that these
coefficients were jointly significant.11
Deriving the Benefit-Cost Measures
We estimated the benefits and costs for Sunsweet’s advertising of its Ones product using the
previously estimated parameters. We inverted both demand functions to be price-dependent. Along
with the two demand specifications, we also performed further simulations. We estimated the
impacts for the point estimates over our 95 usable observations for both demand formulations
and for the two formulations of the cost functions. Then we performed Monte Carlo analyses
by perturbing the error term of the econometrically estimated demand function 1,000 times per
observation (95,000 total draws), based upon the standard error of the estimated equation. From this
analysis we constructed the means and 95% confidence intervals on the estimated benefit-cost ratios.
Table 4 presents the quantities, prices, costs, and benefit-cost results generated for the models
under the two demand specifications and the two cost scenarios.12 Marginal cost per pound varies
slightly depending on the scenario of interest. The average MC0 ranges from $1.37 to $1.59 and
MC1 ranges from $1.46 to $1.77. In all cases the average cost in the presence of advertising is less
than price in the presence of advertising.13
The bottom three rows of table 4 provide the benefit-cost estimates. Depending on the simulation,
a $1.00 expenditure on the advertising of the Ones product results in a $1.26 to $4.35 average return.
The benefit-cost ratio appears sensitive to the specification of the demand function. Lower benefit-
cost estimates appear in the constant-elasticity demand specifications, which is consistent with that
demand model’s lower estimate of the advertising elasticity and restriction on price changes due
to the elasticity restrictions. Which demand specification is correct is arguable, but given that the
constant-elasticity specification is more restrictive on a key parameter in the simulation, future
researchers should be aware of the differences. Nevertheless, the benefit-cost measures are, on
average, above one in all cases.14
The Monte Carlo analysis shows that the confidence intervals include benefit-cost estimates
below one. A review of the output revealed a number of observations where extremely large
estimates of average cost were created, over $5.00 per pound in some cases. In other words, there
were some observations where the model predicts that Sunsweet was making extremely large losses
on its advertising. As long as the benefits exceeded the costs on average, however, Sunsweet was
benefiting from the advertising.
11 A system of regressions using the quantities for all of the other prune brands is available from the authors upon request.
One result of interest from those models is that the higher-priced product, Ones, is being sold on a region of its demand curve
where price response is less elastic than that of Sunsweet’ s lower-priced substitute. This is commensurate with the goal of
successful differentiation.
12 In each scenario, the variables Q0 and a are found using the “solve” routine under SAS 9.2’s “proc model” command.
13 When the demand specification restricts price elasticity to be the same in the advertising and non-advertising scenarios
and the cost specification is one of constant marginal costs, P1 and P0 must be equal, with any change in revenue coming from
quantity changes. Marginal revenue is MRi = Pi(1 + ε−1), where i = 0,1, and ε < 0 is the own-price elasticity of demand.
Since ε is constant and MC0 equals MC1, then setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost forces P1 to equal P0. Table
4 shows that average cost actually falls in this case because of the very large increase in quantity.
14 As a check of diminishing returns, we simulated increases in the cost of the advertising finding that it would require
slightly more than a doubling of the advertising cost before the benefit-cost ratio dropped below one.
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Table 4. Averages for Simulation Variables and Benefit-Cost Estimates
Variable Constant MC Increasing MC
Linear Demand Specification
Q1 (pounds) a,b 37,635 37,635
Q0 (pounds) a 33,010 33,840
P1a $3.55 $3.55
P0 = AC0a $3.29 $3.25
MC1a $1.46 $1.46
MC0a $1.46 $1.37
AC1a $3.31 $3.30
Benefit-Costa $2.73 $3.47
Benefit-Cost, Monte Carloc $3.35 $4.35
($0.57, $6.40) ($0.57, $8.02)
Constant-Elasticity Demand Specification
Q1 (pounds) 37,585 37,585
Q0 (pounds) 27,484 35,547
P1 $3.55 $3.55
P0 = AC0 $3.55 $3.13
MC1 $1.59 $1.77
MC0 $1.59 $1.40
AC1 $3.33 $3.22
Benefit-Costa $1.26 $2.91
Benefit-Cost, Monte Carloc $1.73 $3.19
($0.77, $2.23) ($0.75, $4.87)
Notes: a Results are from the 95 observations in the data set.
b Q1 is the predicted value from the demand regressions.
c Monte Carlo estimates are for 95,000 random simulations with 95% confidence intervals given in parentheses.
Conclusion
The agricultural economics literature does not have any examples of benefit-cost measures for firm-
level advertising in an industry typified by monopolistic competition. A study of prunes provides
a story consistent with firms operating under monopolistic competition. There are several firms
operating in the marketplace, suggesting that barriers to entry are surmountable: this industry had
fewer national firms in 1998 than in 2011, even though total demand has fallen substantially.
Prunes are sold as branded products. Per-unit prices are substantially different for competing brands.
Demand curves are downward sloping and firms are selling on the elastic portion of their demand
curves, and brand advertising affects demand for the product being advertised.
This paper develops a theoretical framework of how a firm in such an industry can use advertising
in the short run to move its demand away from the tangency condition with its average cost to obtain
economic profit before increased differentiation, increased entrance, or increased advertising on the
part of rivals return the firm to pricing at average cost. Using data gathered for the retail prune
industry, we examine such a model for the case of the Sunsweet Growers’ marketing of its new line
of prunes called Ones. The simulations show that the benefits of the advertising on average exceeded
the costs on the order of $1.26 to $4.35 for every dollar expended advertising the new product.
[Received June 2011; final revision received November 2011.]
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